

**In the Matter of a Notice of Major Offense of Alleged Corruption Offenses under the
TENNIS ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAM**

Christian Lindell
(hereinafter “Lindell” or the “Covered Person”)

- and -

International Tennis Integrity Agency
(hereinafter the “ITIA”)

Representing the Covered Person: Michel Asseff Filho, João Marcello Costa, Amanda
Tonani Borer (Asseff Advogados)

Representing the ITIA: Ross Brown, Lily Elliott, Lauren Tainsh
(Onside Law LLP)

Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer,
Tennis Anti-Corruption Program Diana Tesic
(hereinafter “AHO”)

DISPOSITON SUMMARY

The orders found at the end of this Decision are repeated here for the convenience of the reader.

ORDERS

1. *Christian Lindell, a Covered Person as defined in Section B.10. and B.27 of the TACP 2024, is liable for Corruption Offenses pursuant to the following sections of TACP 2024*
 - i. *1 charge under Section D.1.b*
 - ii. *1 charge under Section D.1.d*
 - iii. *1 charge under Section D.1.e*
 - iv. *1 charge under Section D.2.a.i*
2. *Pursuant to the TACP and Guidelines the sanctions imposed on the Covered Person for these breaches of the 2024 TACP are a ban from Participation in any Sanctioned Event for a period of seven (7) years in accordance with Section H.*
3. *The above ordered suspension shall commence on and is effective from the day after this Decision as prescribed in Section F.6.h.(ii) of the 2024 TACP. The period begins on the 10 June 2025 and ends on the 9 June 2032.*
4. *Under Section H.1.a.(i) a fine of \$ 10,000 USD is imposed. A payment plan may be agreed between parties for payment of this fine.*

A. Parties:

1. The International Tennis Integrity Agency (“ITIA”) is the independent body responsible for enforcing the Tennis Anti-Corruption Program (“TACP” or “the Program”) across professional tennis worldwide. It is responsible for investigating and prosecuting cases of alleged corruption offenses in professional tennis.
2. Mr Christian Lindell (the “Covered Person” or “Mr Lindell”) is a former professional tennis player from Sweden. At the material time, he was a “Covered Person” within the meaning of the TACP. He was charged by the ITIA with having committed certain corruption offenses during professional tennis matches held between April and May 2018 in Brazil.
3. Diana Tesic holds the appointment as the Anti-Corruption hearing Officer (“AHO”) under the TACP.

B. Procedural History

4. The alleged Corruption Offenses took place between [REDACTED] April 2018 and [REDACTED] May 2018. Therefore, under Section K.6 of the 2024 TACP, the matter is governed substantively by the TACP 2018. The Notice of Major Offense was issued in 2024, and thus the TACP 2024 governs the procedure by which the matter is heard.
5. On 24 October 2024, the ITIA issued a Notice of Major Offense (“Notice”) to the Covered Person, Mr Lindell, alleging multiple Corruption Offenses under the 2018 TACP. The Notice was sent simultaneously to an Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer, Ms. Diana Testic, in accordance with TACP Section G.1.a.
6. The Covered Person responded within the deadline pursuant to G.1.b TACP 2024 and requested a hearing, which was confirmed during a directions call on 28 November 2024 via Microsoft Teams.
7. Attending the call were the AHO, representatives of Mr Lindell (Michel Asseff Filho, João Marcello Costa, Amanda Tonani Borer), and representatives of the ITIA (Ross Brown, Jodie Cox). During that call, no objections were raised to the AHO’s jurisdiction or appointment. The Parties agreed on the procedure to be followed, as reflected in the Procedural Order 1 (“PO#1”) issued on the same day, which included deadlines for submissions, production of documents, and hearing procedures. The Procedural Order is supplementary to the carrying out of the arbitration process under the TACP.
8. The ITIA fully complied with all deadlines established in PO #1. It made full disclosure of documents on 19 December 2024, filed witness statements on 24 January 2025, and submitted its written brief on 29 January 2025. The ITIA also filed reply submissions on 26 February 2025.
9. The Mr Lindell filed his Answering Brief on 19 February 2025 and a reply to the ITIA’s submissions on 5 March 2025. He also provided witness evidence from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED].
10. The hearing was originally scheduled for 11 March 2025. On that date, counsel for Mr Lindell informed the AHO that Mr Lindell was [REDACTED], preventing his participation. Counsel requested a rescheduling of the hearing to ensure Mr Lindell could attend and fully participate in his defense. The ITIA acknowledged the importance of Mr Lindell’s presence. After hearing arguments from both sides, the AHO issued Procedural Order 2 (“PO#2”) rescheduling the hearing for 19 March 2025.
11. A one-day virtual hearing took place on 19 March 2025, as scheduled. During the hearing, the ITIA presented its witnesses, who were subject to cross-examination. The Covered Person had the opportunity to present evidence and make oral arguments.
12. In attendance at the hearing were:

AHO	Diana Testic
For the ITIA	Ross Brown, Lily Elliott, Lauren Tainsh (Counsel, Onside Law);

- b. **Charge 2:** A doubles match involving Lindell and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] against [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] April 2018 at the same tournament, where Lindell and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
 - c. **Charge 3:** A doubles match involving Lindell and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] against Diego Matos and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] May 2018 at the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Tournament in Brasilia, Brazil, where Lindell and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
 - d. **Charge 4:** Relating to the matches subject of Charges 1,2 and 3 (additionally or alternatively.)
 - e. **Charge 5:** A singles match between Lindell and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] May 2018 at the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] tournament in [REDACTED] Brazil, where Lindell [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
18. The the results of these matches aligned with suspicious betting patterns flagged by betting operators. For Matches 1-3, betting alerts from [REDACTED] and Sportradar identified unusual activity, including large, targeted bets on specific outcomes (e.g., losing the first set but winning the match), which were placed by individuals later identified as associates of criminal match-fixing networks. No such betting anomalies were flagged for Match 4 (Charge 5).
19. The ITIA's investigation into Mr Lindell began in late 2018, following information-sharing agreements with Australian and Belgian law enforcement authorities. The Australian police investigation, initiated in 2017, targeted a match-fixing syndicate led by Ravinder Singh Dandiwal, with Australian nationals Harsimrat Singh and Rajesh Kumar identified as key associates. The Belgian police investigation, launched in 2018, focused on a separate syndicate led by Grigor Sargsyan, with Sebastian Rivera and Diego Matos as associates. Both Dandiwal and Sargsyan were known to the ITIA as orchestrators of match-fixing schemes in professional tennis, as confirmed by prior criminal proceedings.
20. As part of its previous investigations, the ITIA obtained direct access to the phones of Diego Matos and Mr Lindell in 2018, following their cooperation with the Tennis Integrity Unit (TIU), the ITIA's predecessor. The ITIA also received phone data from the Australian and Belgian investigations, including screenshots of WhatsApp messages and call logs, which form a significant part of the evidence in this case.
21. Matches 1-3 were previously found to involve match-fixing in separate proceedings. Matches 1 and 2 (Charges 1 and 2) were part of Australian criminal proceedings against Dandiwal's network, resulting in convictions for Singh and Kumar in 2020. Match 3 (Charge 3) was addressed in an ITIA case against Diego Matos in 2021, where Matos was found to have contrived the outcome and subsequently banned.
22. The Covered Person, in his interview with the ITIA's investigator Dee Bain and at the Hearing, denied any wrongdoing and asserted that he had never fixed any aspect of a match, or received any money for fixing a match. He also denied soliciting other players to fix aspects of a match.

D. The Applicable Law and Jurisdiction

23. It is undisputed that the applicable rules are TACP 2018 with regards to the alleged Major Offenses and the TACP 2024 with regards to the procedure.
24. No party has objected to the appointment of the AHO, undersigned, to hear this matter. She has been properly appointed and seized of the matters in dispute.
25. No other matters relating to jurisdiction or the arbitrability of these matters have been raised by any party.

E. Position of the Parties

26. The AHO has thoroughly reviewed all the evidence and the written and oral submissions from both parties. Below is a summary of the key contentions presented by the parties. Any evidence or submissions not explicitly mentioned are still considered in the AHO's overall analysis

The ITIA

27. On 29 January 2025, the ITIA filed its brief. The ITIA alleged that Mr Lindell committed multiple Corruption Offenses under the 2018 TACP by engaging in match-fixing activities and failing to report corrupt approaches. The charges involve three counts of match-fixing (Charges 1-3) and two counts of failure to report (Charges 4-5).
28. The ITIA's case is built on a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence, including:
 - a. Alerts from betting operators (e.g., ██████████ Sportradar) showing suspicious betting patterns on the matches in question, with large, targeted bets placed by known associates of criminal networks.
 - b. Screenshots of WhatsApp messages provided by the Australian police investigation into Ravinder Singh Dandiwal's network, extracted from the phones of Harsimrat Singh and Rajesh Kumar, indicating correspondence between Dandiwal and a "Bafolino CL", who the ITIA alleges is Lindell, in match-fixing discussions.
 - c. A log of text messages provided by the Belgian police investigation into Grigor Sargsyan's network, indicating discussions of match-fixing involving Lindell.
 - d. Messages and contacts extracted directly by the ITIA from the phones of Diego Matos and Christian Lindell, including a contact in Matos' phone which saved Lindell's number as "Bafolino" and Lindell's phone containing payment reference numbers associated with a Western Union transfer from Dandiwal.
 - e. Western Union transfer receipts showing payments from Singh and Kumar to ██████████ ██████████ and ██████████ ██████████ with reference numbers found on Lindell's phone.
 - f. Scorecards and point-by-point data showing outcomes consistent with the

suspicious betting patterns (e.g., losing the first set but winning the match).

- g. Statements from Dee Bain (ITIA investigator) detailing the investigation and links to criminal networks, and Mark Swarbrick (Betting Liaison Officer) confirming the suspicious nature of the betting activity.
- h. Matches 1-3 were previously found to be fixed in separate proceedings (Australian criminal proceedings for Matches 1-2, ITIA case against Diego Matos for Match 3).

29. In terms of the specific Charges, the ITIA argues as follows:

30. *Charge 1 (██████ v. ██████ April 2018)*

- a. Lindell acted as a middleman to fix this match, where ██████ the ██████ set (██████) but ██████ the match (██████).
- b. Evidence relied upon includes screenshots of WhatsApp messages from the Australian police investigation, extracted from Singh's phone, showing conversations between Singh and Kumar that implicate Lindell (under the name "Bafolino CL") in discussions about the match outcome.
- c. Betting data shows Kumar and Singh placed bets on this outcome (Kumar's bet of \$2,000 AUD yielded \$17,500).
- d. Western Union payments of \$2,650 AUD each to ██████ and ██████ on ██████ April 2018, with reference numbers found on Lindell's phone, suggest payment for the fix.
- e. The ITIA asserts breaches of Sections D.1.d (contriving the outcome), D.1.e (soliciting/facilitating lack of best efforts), and D.1.f (accepting money to influence efforts).

31. *Charge 2 (Lindell ██████ v. ██████ April 2018)*

- a. Lindell played in this match, ██████ after ██████ the ██████ set. The ITIA argues that Lindell contrived the outcome to align with suspicious bets.
- b. Evidence relied upon includes a screenshot from the Australian police investigation of a message from Dandiwal to Singh stating "all our players in it", and phone records directly accessed by the ITIA showing three calls from Lindell's phone to ██████ (a Dandiwal associate) on the match day.
- c. A ██████ alert reported a \$25,000 AUD attempted bet by Kumar on ██████ to ██████ the ██████ set and ██████ the match (which was ultimately rejected by the betting site).
- d. A double fault by Lindell at a critical point ██████ ensured ██████.
- e. The ITIA asserts breaches of Sections D.1.d and D.1.e.

32. *Charge 3 (Lindell ██████ v. Matos ██████ May 2018)*

- a. Lindell played in this match, ██████ after ██████ the ██████ set. The ITIA alleges Lindell fixed the match with involvement from both Dandiwal's and Sargsyan's networks.
- b. Evidence includes Sportradar alerts of suspicious bets (nine accumulator bets, €3,040 total stake) on Lindell ██████ to ██████ the match, Matos ██████ to ██████ the

████ set, and Lindell ██████ to █████ the █████ set. The match card confirms the outcome.

- c. Messages from the Belgian police investigation, extracted from Rivera's and Sargsyan's phones, indicate that Matos agreed to make an offer, with Sargsyan confirming the fix
- d. Matos' phone, directly accessed by the ITIA, lists Lindell's number as "Bafolino".
- e. A message from ██████ to Lindell on █████ May 2018 mentioning "Transferred," sourced from the Australian investigation, suggests possible payment.
- f. The ITIA asserts a breach of Section D.1.d.

33. Charge 4 (Alternative, Matches in Charges 1-3)

- a. The ITIA alleges that Lindell failed to report corrupt approaches related to the matches in Charges 1-3, breaching Section D.2.a.i.
- b. Evidence includes the photos of WhatsApp messages from the Australian investigation implicating Lindell, attempted phone calls to ██████ and messages between Sargsyan and Rivera indicating an offer via Matos (Belgian investigation), none of which Lindell reported to the Tennis Integrity Unit (TIU).

34. Charge 5 (Lindell v. ██████ ██████ May 2018)

- a. Lindell ██████ this match ██████ ██████ ██████ The ITIA alleges Lindell failed to report a corrupt approach, breaching Section D.2.a.i.
- b. Evidence includes messages from the Belgian investigation, extracted from Rivera's and Sargsyan's phones, with Rivera stating, "Also I have info for tomorrow, Please call me is with Lindell," followed by a call, suggesting an approach was made.
- c. No betting anomalies were noted for this match.

35. As to the sanction, the ITIA submitted that Mr Lindell be suspended from Participation in any Sanctioned Event for ten years and fined between US\$25,000 and US\$50,000, based on the 2024 Sanctioning Guidelines. The ITIA categorizes the offenses as B1 (high culpability, significant impact), citing the multiple charges, premeditation, involvement with two criminal networks, and reputational damage to tennis, with no mitigating factors like early admission or substantial assistance.

The Covered Person

36. Mr Lindell's position was conveyed through his Answering Brief, reply submissions, and testimony at the hearing. Mr Lindell denies all charges, asserting he did not engage in any match-fixing activities or receive corrupt payments. He asserts that the ITIA's case relies mainly on circumstantial and inferential evidence that lacks probative value. In response to the ITIA's contentions, he advanced the following lines of defence:

- a. The ITIA suggests that Western Union payments to accounts linked to Mr Lindell's in laws were effectively corrupt proceeds. Mr Lindell, however, provides an alternative explanation in that these sums correspond to a legitimate advance on appearance fees for a privately organized tennis event by Dandiwal. He requested Dandiwal send the advance directly to ██████. These funds were used cover ██████ for ██████. There is no evidence linking these payments to match-fixing.

- b. He denies any connection to the name “Bafolino” and claims no knowledge of corrupt approaches. He disputes the reliability of the “Bafolino CL” Whatsapp messages. Mr Lindell emphasizes that no messages were not found on his phone despite the ITIA’s access to it in 2018, and Dee Bain testified she could not confirm the number associated with the contact “Bafolino CL” on the pictures of the Whatsapp Messages indeed belonged to Mr Lindell. He argues the messages lack chain of custody and metadata, rendering them inadmissible.
- c. Mr Lindell emphasizes that phone references to “Bafolino” or “Bafolino CL” appear solely in the devices of alleged fixers or their associates, and he asserts that he neither controls nor has knowledge of how others decide to save his or anyone else’s contact information. In his view, the partial text-message records produced by the ITIA do not show any direct communication from him agreeing to, or coordinating, a fix. He further highlights the absence of any direct witness testimony or statements from his co-players attributing match-fixing conduct to him.
- d. Mr Lindell denies knowing Harsimrat Singh, Rajesh Kumar, or Grigor Sargsyan, and asserts he only met Ravinder Singh Dandiwal in 2018, believing him to be a legitimate tournament organizer.
- e. He argues it is implausible that he would coordinate with two criminal networks (Dandiwal’s and Sargsyan’s) simultaneously, as this would trigger detection by betting regulators like Sportradar due to abnormal betting volumes. For Charge 5, he notes the absence of betting anomalies (confirmed by Swarbrick) and that he ██████ the match, undermining any match-fixing inference.
- f. Mr Lindell points out that the ITIA’s case lacks corroborative testimony from co-players or other direct evidence that he instructed any individual to contrive a match result. He submits that suspicion, while perhaps fueled by the timing of certain financial transactions and references in third-party messages, cannot on its own satisfy the requirement of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he knowingly engaged in or facilitated a match fix.
- g. As to the sanction, Mr Lindell requests full acquittal, arguing the evidence is insufficient. Alternatively, he seeks a conviction limited to Charge 4 (failure to report) with a reduced penalty, citing the lack of direct evidence, ██████, ██████, and the severe impact a ban would have on ██████.

F. Applicable Provisions of the 2024 TACP

37. Sections H of the 2024 TACP read as follows:

“H.1 The penalty for any Corruption Offense shall be determined by the AHO in accordance with the procedures set forth in Section G, and may include:

H.1.a. With respect to any Player, (i) a fine of up to \$250,000 plus an amount equal to the value of any winnings or other amounts received by such Covered

Person in connection with any Corruption Offense; (ii) ineligibility from Participation in any Sanctioned Events for a period of up to three years unless permitted under Section H.1.c; and (iii) with respect to any violation of Section D.1, clauses (c) – (p), Section D.2 and Section F, ineligibility from Participation in any Sanctioned Events for a maximum period of permanent ineligibility unless permitted under Section H.1.c.

G. Evidence and Burden of Proof

38. A substantial body of evidence was submitted by the ITIA in support of its allegations against Mr Lindell. Pursuant to Section G.3.a of the TACP, the ITIA bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a Corruption Offense has been committed. This means the ITIA must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that Mr Lindell engaged in the alleged conduct. As confirmed in the *Luncanu* decision, a mere possibility of wrongdoing is insufficient to meet this threshold; the AHO must be satisfied that the evidence presented tilts the balance, even if marginally, in favor of finding a Corruption Offense.
39. Under Section G.2.c of the 2024 TACP, the AHO may admit evidence provided it is relevant to the charges and its authenticity can be reasonably verified, even if such evidence might be inadmissible in a court of law. The TACP permits the AHO to consider evidence from varied sources, including third-party investigations such as those conducted by law enforcement, provided a threshold of reliability is met. In this case, the ITIA has presented evidence from multiple origins, including betting alerts from operators like ██████████ and Sportradar, photos of partial text messages extracted from third-party mobile devices during the Australian and Belgian criminal investigations, direct ITIA access to Mr Lindell's and Mr Matos' phones, Western Union payment records, and witness testimony from Dee Bain and Mark Swarbrick. Consistent with prior decisions, such as in the *Crepatte* case, the AHO finds that the TACP allows the consideration of such diverse sources, provided their relevance and reliability are established.
40. Specifically as it relates to law enforcement investigations, in both the *Crepatte* and *Luncanu* decisions, the AHOs considered that while law enforcement records are ordinarily assumed to be authentic, their probative value still depends on whether they establish a Covered Person's direct or knowing participation. Here, although there is no dispute that the phone records derive from legitimate police procedures, Mr Lindell challenges the inferences drawn from references to "Bafolino" or "Bafolino CL." As the AHO noted in *Crepatte*, where partial WhatsApp content did not itself suffice to prove match-fixing without further corroboration, these fragments, absent clear authorship or acceptance on Mr Lindell's side, must be approached with caution.
41. The AHO is also entitled to draw logical inferences from the totality of the evidence, even where direct evidence of wrongdoing may be absent. The *Luncanu* decision establishes that the cumulative effect of evidence, such as: communications with known fixers, suspicious betting patterns, and financial transactions, can support a finding of corruption, even if individual pieces are not conclusive on their own. Similarly, in the *Crepatte* case, the AHO held that the absence of direct evidence does not preclude a finding of guilt where logical inferences can be drawn from the combination of betting data, phone records, and third-party investigations.

42. In this matter, Mr Lindell has challenged the authenticity of certain WhatsApp messages labeled "Bafolino CL," but the AHO finds that their source, the Australian police investigation, and context, provide sufficient grounds for their admissibility. The AHO will assess the weight of this evidence, alongside the betting patterns, payment records, and prior findings of match-fixing in Matches 1-3, to determine whether the ITIA has met its burden.
43. The AHO notes that the ITIA's case is inferential and the evidence in this matter is predominantly circumstantial. In reaching her conclusions the AHO has considered that the absence of direct evidence. The AHO has carefully evaluated the probative value and reliability of the inferential evidence and examined whether a plausible innocent explanation exists for the anomalies observed, as required under the preponderance standard.

H. Decision

44. The AHO has carefully considered all the facts, allegations, legal arguments and evidence submitted by the Parties in the present proceedings. Reference is made in this Decision only to the evidence and submissions considered necessary to explain the reasoning.
45. The central issue is whether the ITIA has established, on the preponderance of the evidence, that Christian Lindell committed the alleged breaches of the 2018 TACP. This determination involves assessing the complex web of evidence presented, much of which is circumstantial and requires careful drawing of inferences. In line with prior ITIA awards (*Crepatte; Luncanu*), the AHO assesses each charge by asking whether, in the absence of direct evidence, the cumulative weight of the circumstantial evidence tips the balance that it is more likely than not, while recognising that not every strand of circumstantial evidence must appear in every charge.

Charge 1 – Match: █████ v █████ (Singles), █████ April 2018

46. Charge 1 concerns the singles match between █████ █████ and █████ █████ on █████ April 2018, alleging breaches by Mr Lindell of Section D.1.d (Contriving the outcome of an Event), Section D.1.e (Soliciting or facilitating a Player not to use their best efforts), and Section D.1.f (Soliciting or accepting money, benefit or Consideration with the intention of negatively influencing a Player's best efforts) of the 2018 TACP.
47. A central preliminary issue to Charge 1 is the attribution of the name "Bafolino CL" used in WhatsApp communications with Ravinder Singh Dandiwal, which were subsequently forwarded by Dandiwal to Harsimrat Singh and form part of the evidence provided by the Australian police investigation. Mr Lindell has denied that "Bafolino CL" is him or a nickname he uses. He has also raised concerns regarding the evidentiary value of these messages, noting they were not found on his phone, but consist of a screenshot of another device's screen and questions their chain of custody. As noted above in paragraph 42, the AHO accepts the reliability of the Whatsapp messages.
48. The AHO has carefully considered these submissions. Weighing all the available evidence, the AHO is satisfied, on the preponderance of the evidence, that the "Bafolino

CL" engaging in these communications was, in fact, Mr Christian Lindell. This conclusion is based on the following cumulative pieces of circumstantial evidence:

- a. Mr Lindell's confirmed phone number [REDACTED] was saved in the contacts of fellow player Diego Matos under the name "Bafolino". This is a distinctive nickname with no alternative candidate and it independently links Mr Lindell to the nickname "Bafolino."
 - b. The WhatsApp messages with Dandiwal's network use the name "Bafolino CL". The appending of the initials "CL", which are Mr Lindell's own initials, to the already linked nickname "Bafolino" makes the "CL" reference highly specific to him.
 - c. The chat's internal content refers to events in Brazil and there are expressions in Portuguese.
 - d. Mr Lindell admitted knowing and being in contact with Ravinder Singh Dandiwal around the material time, albeit in the context of discussions about the Thailand Open. This establishes a connection and communication channel between Mr Lindell and Dandiwal, the individual whose network was using the "Bafolino CL" identifier.
 - e. While the ITIA investigator, Ms. Bain, conceded she could not *definitively* confirm the link based solely on the screenshots, she also testified her expert opinion was that it was likely Mr Lindell based on the overall context of the investigation.
 - f. The use of nicknames is common in the arrangement of illicit activities to obscure identities.
49. While Mr Lindell credibly denied being 'Bafolino CL' and no messages were found on his phone, the distinctive nickname 'Bafolino' in Matos' contacts, the 'CL' initials matching his name, and his admitted contact with Dandiwal, and the above indicia collectively suggest it is more likely than not that he was the individual, despite the absence of direct confirmation.
50. **Section D.1.d (Contriving):** Having established that "Bafolino CL" is Mr Lindell, the content of the WhatsApp messages becomes directly attributable to him.
51. On [REDACTED] April 2018 "Bafolino CL" sent Mr Ravinder Singh Dandiwal the message: "*set [REDACTED] luego [REDACTED] gana match ok, deal?*" Mr Dandiwal responded: "*Deal confirmed. Bets going in.*"
52. Within three hours of that exchange, Mr Harsimrat Singh and Mr Rajesh Kumar, associates of Mr Dandiwal, staked approximately \$3000.00 on the exact proposition "[REDACTED] to [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] set, [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] the match." This triggered alerts for suspicious betting across [REDACTED] and Sportsradar which was communicated to the TIU at the time.
53. The match between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] concluded with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] which is the exact outcome allegedly planned and wagered upon. Total winnings amounted to approximately \$17,000.00. The AHO accepts the ITIA's expert testimony that routine pre-match betting of this kind, rather than in-play wagering, is indicative of foreknowledge of a fix.
54. Mr Lindell's assertion that he was focused on appearance fees and tournament success at the [REDACTED] suggests an incentive to win, not fix. However, this does not preclude

his role as a facilitator or conduit in enabling agreements between other players and Dandiwal's network for the █████ v. █████ match on █████ April 2018, a match in which he did not participate.

55. Accordingly, the combination of the evidence from the WhatsApp communications setting the fix, the high-risk bets placed immediately thereafter by the same network and the realisation of the pre-determined match result, leads the AHO to find that the ITIA has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr Lindell contrived or attempted to contrive the outcome of the █████ v █████ match on █████ April 2018. Accordingly, Mr Lindell is found to be in breach of Section D.1.d of the 2018 TACP.
56. **Section D.1.e (Facilitating Best Efforts):** There is no direct admission or messages in which Mr Lindell communicates to either Mr █████ or Mr █████ to fix the match. The question, therefore, is whether the surrounding facts nonetheless permit the AHO, on the preponderance of the evidence, to infer that such a solicitation must have occurred.
57. The inference is warranted for the following cumulative reasons, each rooted in uncontested circumstantial evidence:
58. The WhatsApp exchange at paragraph 51 above, specifies a highly particular sequence: █████ to █████ the █████ set, █████ the match. Achieving that pattern could not be left to chance and requires at least one of the players to deliberately withhold his best effort at different junctures of play. In other words, the very blueprint of the fix presupposes player cooperation. The ITIA's expert witness further opined that significant stake on such specific and targeted betting where there is no supporting rationale for the bets placed in terms of the context of the match is indicative of fixing. Without a request or instruction, there is no rational path for the end result to exactly reflect the agreed fix.
59. Mr Lindell offered no alternative mechanism by which the players could have learned of, or voluntarily executed, the deal made with Mr Dandiwal.
60. Taken together, these strands of circumstantial evidence satisfy the AHO that it is more probable than not that Mr Lindell, acting as a conduit, facilitated the fix by negotiating the corrupt outcome with the Dandiwal network, and thus communicated corresponding instructions to at least one of the players so that best efforts were not used at critical points to deliver the agreed match result. Accordingly, even in the absence of a direct message, the AHO finds that the ITIA has discharged its burden under Section D.1.e.
61. **Section D.1.f (Accepting Payment/Benefit):** Having found that Mr Lindell contrived the outcome of Match 1 in breach of Section D.1.d and thereby also breached Section D.1.e, the AHO now turns to the alleged breach of Section D.1.f of the 2018 TACP. This section requires the ITIA to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr Lindell solicited or accepted money, benefit, or consideration with the intention of negatively influencing best efforts in Match 1. As established in precedents such as *ITIA v Crepatte*, this requires evidence of some tangible benefit having been received by the Covered Person, or circumstances supporting a strong and reasonable inference of such receipt.
62. The ITIA presented evidence of two Western Union payments, each for \$2,650 AUD (totaling \$5,300 AUD). These payments were sent on █████ April 2018, █████ days after Match 1 concluded, by Rajesh Kumar and Harsimrat Singh, known associates of Ravinder Singh Dandiwal and who were involved in the suspicious betting on Match 1. The recipients of

these funds were [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] who are [REDACTED] [REDACTED] respectively. The Western Union reference numbers for these specific transfers were found saved on Mr Lindell's own mobile phone.

63. Mr Lindell acknowledged that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] received these payments. However, he contended that these sums were an advance on an appearance fee for a future, unrelated tennis event organized by Dandiwal, and that he had requested the funds be sent to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to assist with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. While Lindell's credible explanation of appearance fees is plausible, the link to Dandiwal's associates and lack of evidence tying the funds to this future event tip the balance toward a corrupt intent,
64. In the *Luini* case, this AHO dismissed D.1.f charges where the evidence of a tangible benefit reaching the player was too tenuous, even if contrivance was proven and messages discussed payment offers. A more concrete link was required. In *Luini* the funds were received more than two months after the suspect match and via an unrelated business intermediary, whereas here the transfers followed within 48 hours and were routed to [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
65. In the present circumstances, having found that Mr Lindell actively contrived Match 1 with Dandiwal's network significantly undermines the plausibility of his explanation for these specific funds being for a future appearance fee. The AHO considers factors such as the timing and origin of the payments from the individuals involved in betting activities related to the fix and the direct link to Mr Lindell's [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to be particularly compelling. Directing payments through [REDACTED] [REDACTED] has been a method used by match-fixing networks to obscure the illicit nature of funds and the direct link to the player. The presence of the two Western Union reference numbers in Mr Lindell's own mobile phone shows he at the very least monitored the transfers, satisfying the 'tangible benefit' threshold accepted in previous ITIA cases.
66. The "Bafolino CL" messages indicate that Mr Lindell agreed to a "deal" with Dandiwal regarding Match 1. In the context of match-fixing, a "deal" inherently implies financial remuneration. These payments align logically as the fulfillment of such a corrupt deal. The AHO therefore infers that these payments constitute a tangible benefit received by Mr Lindell in connection with the contrivance of Match 1.
67. Given Mr Lindell's established culpability for contriving Match 1, his explanation for these payments, timed perfectly with the end of Match 1, from the fixers, to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and tracked on his phone, no longer stands as sufficiently plausible to rebut the strong inference that they were, in fact, the proceeds of his corrupt conduct. The AHO therefore finds that the ITIA has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr Lindell accepted money or benefit with the intention of negatively influencing a Player's best efforts in relation to Match 1. Accordingly, Mr Lindell is found to be in breach of Section D.1.f of the 2018 TACP.

Charge 2 – Match: Lindell, [REDACTED] v [REDACTED] (Doubles), [REDACTED] April 2018

68. Section D.1.d (Contriving): The ITIA case regarding this match relies on several circumstantial factors which the ITIA argues the cumulative evidence points to contrivance:

- a. a message from Mr Dandiwal to Mr Singh stating "Match is after 9 hours...all our players in it";
 - b. attempted phone calls: Records show Mr Lindell attempted three calls to the number associated with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] approximately three hours before the match. These calls had a duration of "00:00:00", indicating they were unanswered;
 - c. a betting context where a significant bet (\$25,000 AUD) was attempted (though ultimately rejected by the operator due to suspicion) by Mr Kumar, a known Dandiwal associate, predicting the specific outcome of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] set but [REDACTED] the match. This indicates the network's interest and intended betting pattern for this match; and
 - d. the match outcome which concluded with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] consistent with the type of outcome Kumar attempted to bet on. Critically, it was confirmed at the hearing that Mr Lindell served [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] [REDACTED], allowing the other pair to [REDACTED].
69. Mr Lindell denies any wrongdoing. He explains the failed calls to [REDACTED] were likely related to the [REDACTED] fee. He attributes the double fault to pressure.
70. Examining the totality of the evidence the AHO is not convinced that the ITIA has met the standard that it is more likely than not that Mr Lindell contrived an aspect of this match. The Dandiwal message ("all our players in it") is ambiguous. It does not specifically name Lindell, nor does it confirm an actual agreement was reached with any player, let alone Lindell specifically. It merely suggests a potential interest or assumption by Dandiwal. Unlike Charge 1, the evidence here lacks any communication fixing a precise score-line or any post-match financial flow to Lindell, two elements the AHO considered decisive in Charge 1.
71. The betting attempt by Kumar, while demonstrating the network's plan and raising suspicion about the match's integrity, does not directly implicate Lindell. It shows the network's intent, but not necessarily Lindell's participation or even awareness.
72. The unanswered calls made to [REDACTED] provide no proof of communication or arrangement being made by Lindell at that time. While the AHO finds the timing of the calls suspicious being shortly before a match, it does not, in itself, prove that any wrongdoing occurred during that attempt.
73. This leaves Mr Lindell's double fault at [REDACTED]. This double fault is suspicious, given its timing and betting attempt. It was his action, entirely within his control, at the most critical moment, delivering an outcome consistent with the suspicious betting attempt. Such an error is a known method for fixing points/matches. However, Lindell's credible attribution to pressure and the lack of statistical analysis showing it deviates from his norm under stress, weaken the contrivance inference.
74. A single double fault, even one as critically timed as this, requires strong corroborating evidence to be deemed contrivance rather than an error under pressure, especially when serious allegations carrying severe consequences are involved. The ITIA does not sufficiently bridge the gap to prove, on the preponderance of evidence, that Lindell personally entered into an agreement and deliberately executed that double fault as part of a contrivance. The ambiguity of the supporting circumstantial evidence means that the possibility of the double fault being a result of immense pressure cannot be dismissed.

75. Accordingly, the evidence directly implicating Mr Lindell in a contrivance for this match does not meet the preponderance standard. Charge 2, alleging breaches of Sections D.1.d and D.1.e, is therefore dismissed.

Charge 3 – Match: Lindell, [REDACTED] v Matos, [REDACTED] (Doubles), [REDACTED] May 2018

76. **Section D.1.d (Contriving):** The ITIA alleges a breach of Section D.1.d (Contriving) of the 2018 TACP by the Covered Person. The ITIA relies on evidence including communications between Grigor Sargsyan and Sebastian Rivera discussing fixing this match, betting alerts from Sportradar, the match outcome, and the subsequent finding by another AHO that Diego Matos contrived this match.

77. The ITIA presented WhatsApp messages between Sargsyan and Rivera where Sargsyan outlines a potential fixing arrangement for this match and asks Rivera to have Diego Matos convey an "offer for [REDACTED] or lindell". This explicitly indicates Sargsyan's intention to corrupt the Lindell, [REDACTED] pair. Further communications show Sargsyan proceeding as if a fix was confirmed. Diego Matos, Mr Lindell's opponent in this match and who also had saved Mr Lindell as a contact in his phone under the name "Bafolino," was later found liable by the ITIA for contriving this specific match. Betting alerts also indicated suspicious accumulator bets involving this match, and the match outcome followed a pattern sometimes associated with match-fixing ie. Lindell, [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] set, [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] the [REDACTED].

78. The Covered Person denies any involvement or knowledge of a fix. He argues the evidence is purely inferential regarding his participation.

79. The critical point here is the phrase "offer for [REDACTED] or lindell". While this clearly shows Sargsyan's intent to approach the doubles pair via Matos, it explicitly leaves open the possibility that the approach was made to, or the agreement was ultimately secured with, [REDACTED] rather than Lindell, or potentially neither. The ITIA's case against Lindell requires demonstrating, on the preponderance of evidence, that Mr Lindell was the one who contrived or attempted the contrivance.

80. There is no evidence presented linking Mr Lindell personally to this contrivance. No messages confirming an agreement were produced. No payments specifically related to this match were shown to have been sent by Sargasyan's network or received by Lindell or his associates. While the match outcome pattern is noted, no specific analysis of Lindell's individual play, for example unusual errors at key moments aligned with the alleged plan, was presented to demonstrate his active participation in the contrivance.

81. The fact that Diego Matos was found liable for contriving this match is significant context, confirming corrupt activity occurred involving Sargsyan's network in this specific match. However, Diego Matos's guilt does not automatically prove Mr Lindell's involvement. It remains possible that Matos (either alone or with his partner [REDACTED] or perhaps by involving [REDACTED] per the "OR" clause) contrived the outcome without Mr Lindell's knowledge or consent.

82. Matos' liability confirms corrupt activity, but the 'offer for [REDACTED] or Lindell' message leaves ambiguity, with no evidence Matos targeted Lindell. While the links through Matos and the betting pattern suggest network involvement, but without messages or payments

linking Lindell, the chain of inference required to connect his participation in the contrivance remains speculative.

83. Based on the evidence presented, the AHO finds that the ITIA has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that Christian Lindell personally committed a breach of Section D.1.d of the 2018 TACP by contriving an aspect of the match played on [REDACTED] May 2018. The charge is therefore dismissed.
84. As the finding is that contrivance by Lindell under D.1.d was not proven, the related charge of soliciting/facilitating best efforts under D.1.e (which would stem from the same alleged agreement/actions) is also dismissed.

Charge 4 – Failure to Report Corrupt Approaches (Relating to Matches 1, 2, and 3)

85. The ITIA alleged, additionally or alternatively to Charges 1, 2, and 3, that the Covered Person committed three separate breaches of Section D.2.a.i of the 2018 TACP by failing to report corrupt approaches related to the matches played on [REDACTED] April 2018 (Match 1), [REDACTED] April 2018 (Match 2), and [REDACTED] May 2018 (Match 3). Section D.2.a.i obligates a Player to report any approach by any person requesting the Player to influence the outcome or any other aspect of any Event, as soon as possible. The duty to report is continuous until satisfied and applies even where the player is himself complicit.
86. For a breach of Section D.2.a.i to be established, the ITIA must prove, that it was more likely than not, that the Covered Person (i) was approached with a corrupt proposal relating to the specific Event, or became aware of such an approach or other information giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of corruption, and (ii) failed to report such incident/knowledge/suspicion to the TIU (now ITIA) as soon as possible.
87. Regarding Match 1 ([REDACTED] April 2018): The AHO has found that Mr Lindell, identified in the Whatsapp messages as "Bafolino CL," engaged in communications with Mr Dandiwal where they discussed and agreed upon a plan to contrive the outcome of the singles match between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] April 2018. These communications and the agreed-upon "deal" inherently mean Mr Lindell was a party to, and had direct knowledge of, a corrupt plan to influence an Event.
88. Such involvement and knowledge directly trigger the reporting obligations under Section D.2.a.i of the 2018 TACP. The ITIA has alleged that no such report was made by Mr Lindell, and Mr Lindell has not presented evidence of having made such a report.
89. Given the finding that Mr Lindell was involved in the contrivance of Match 1, he possessed explicit knowledge of a Corruption Offense and of an approach or agreement designed to influence an Event. His failure to report this to the TIU as soon as possible constitutes a breach of Section D.2.a.i of the 2018 TACP. Therefore, the AHO finds that the component of Charge 4 relating to the failure to report the corrupt approach concerning Match 1 is proven.
90. Regarding Match 2 ([REDACTED] April 2018): The evidence suggesting an approach related to this match included the Dandiwal message "all our players in it" and the calls between Lindell and [REDACTED]. As discussed in paragraphs 70-74 above, this evidence was found to be too ambiguous or open to alternative interpretations to establish, on the preponderance of

the evidence, that Lindell received a specific, reportable corrupt approach concerning Match 2. While Lindell's contact with Dandiwal raises suspicion, there is no corroboration of a specific approach, which the ambiguous message lacks, supporting dismissal for Match 2.

91. Since it has not been established that Mr Lindell received or became aware of a reportable corrupt approach in relation to Match 2, the obligation to report under Section D.2.a.i was not triggered for this specific instance. Therefore, the component of Charge 4 relating to an alleged failure to report concerning Match 2 is not proven and is dismissed.
92. Regarding Match 3 (■ May 2018): The evidence indicated an intent by Sargsyan to have Matos approach Lindell or ■. However, as determined in paragraphs 74-76 above, the ITIA did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that this approach was *actually made* to Lindell or that he otherwise became aware of it in a manner triggering a reporting obligation under D.2.a.i. The dismissal of the contrivance charge (D.1.d) for this match was predicated on the lack of sufficient evidence linking Lindell even inferentially to the corrupt activity, which includes insufficient proof of him receiving the approach. Therefore, the component of Charge 4 relating to an alleged failure to report concerning Match 3 is not proven and is dismissed.
93. Based on the foregoing, the AHO finds Mr Christian Lindell liable for one breach of Section D.2.a.i of the 2018 TACP for failing to report the corrupt approach and agreement concerning the match played on ■ April 2018 (Match 1). The allegations of breaches of Section D.2.a.i concerning the matches played on ■ April 2018 (Match 2) and ■ May 2018 (Match 3) are dismissed.

Charge 5 – Failure to Report (Standalone - Lindell v ■ Singles, ■ May 2018)

94. Charge 5 alleges Mr Lindell breached Section D.2.a.i of the 2018 TACP by failing to report a corrupt approach concerning his match on ■ May 2018. The ITIA relies on a message between third parties and known match fixers, Mr Rivera and Mr Sargsyan, where Mr Rivera stated, "Also I have info for tomorrow, Please call me is with Lindell."
95. To prove this charge, the ITIA must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr Lindell was aware of a reportable corrupt approach or information. The critical phrase "I have info...is with Lindell," originating from a third-party communication to which Mr Lindell was not privy, is ambiguous. It does not, on its own, clearly demonstrate that Mr Lindell personally received a corrupt proposal or was made aware of circumstances that would unequivocally trigger his reporting obligation under Section D.2.a.i.
96. While the message indicates Mr Lindell was a subject of discussion or information between Mr Rivera and Mr Sargsyan, inferring Mr Lindell's personal awareness of a specific, reportable corrupt event from this indirect statement is speculative. There is no additional evidence presented to confirm that the "info" was conveyed to Mr Lindell as a corrupt approach, or that he understood it as such.
97. In the absence of direct evidence or strong cumulative circumstantial evidence linking the Mr Lindell's knowledge or involvement, the AHO finds the evidence for Charge 5 insufficient. The ITIA has not met its burden to prove, that it was more likely than not, that Mr Lindell possessed the requisite awareness of a reportable incident. Therefore, Charge 5, alleging a breach of Section D.2.a.i, is not proven and is dismissed.

Application of the Sanctioning Guidelines to the Facts of this Case

98. Having found the Covered Person, Christian Lindell, liable for four Corruption Offenses under the 2018 TACP related to the match between ██████████ and ██████████ on ██████████ April 2018 (Match 1)—specifically, breaches of Section D.1.d (Contriving the outcome), Section D.1.e (Soliciting or facilitating a player not to use their best efforts), Section D.1.f (Soliciting or accepting money with the intention of negatively influencing a player's best efforts), and Section D.2.a.i (Failure to report a corrupt approach), the AHO must determine the appropriate sanction. This determination is made pursuant to Section H of the 2024 TACP and in accordance with the applicable Sanctioning Guidelines (effective 1 January 2024).

99. The ITIA's written submission contemplated liability across 4 matches and, on that assumption, requested a ten-year period of ineligibility and a substantial fine, placing the case in Category B1. However, given the findings are limited to four charges all relating to Match 1, with all other charges (relating to Matches 2, 3, and 4) dismissed, the AHO must determine the sanction based on the four proven offences tied to Match 1.

100. The Guidelines outline a five-step process for determining the appropriate sanction.

101. Step 1 – Determining the Offense Category:

- a. Culpability: Under the Guidelines The proven offenses now include contriving the outcome of an event (D.1.d), soliciting/facilitating a player not to use best efforts (D.1.e), accepting money with the intention of negatively influencing a player's best efforts (D.1.f), and failing to report a corrupt agreement to which he was a party (D.2.a.i). The communications attributed to Mr Lindell (as "Bafolino CL") with Mr Dandiwal discussing a "deal" to fix Match 1 demonstrate a high degree of planning or premeditation (a Category A factor). By arranging the fix and (as inferred for D.1.e) communicating instructions to at least one player in Match 1, Mr Lindell was acting in concert with Dandiwal's network and at least one player (Category B factor), and could be seen as facilitating or even leading others to commit offenses related to that match.
- b. These are multiple serious offenses (three for Charge 1, one for Charge 4) all related to the same corrupt enterprise concerning Match 1. Considering the direct involvement in orchestrating a fix for financial gain, the culpability is assessed as high, falling into Category B (Medium Culpability).
- c. Impact: Mr Lindell's conduct has a significant material impact on the reputation and/or integrity of the sport (a Category 1 factor). Arranging a match fix, especially in concert with an organized criminal network, directly undermines the core principles of fair competition. Mr Lindell additionally received a relatively high value of illicit gain (a Category 1 factor), specifically \$5,300 AUD (approx. \$3,500-\$4,000 USD at the time) for his role in fixing Match 1. The impact is therefore assessed as Category 1 (Significant impact).
- d. Overall Category: Based on the assessment of culpability and impact, the proven offenses fall into Category B1.

102. Step 2 – Starting Point and Range:

- a. According to the Sanctioning Guidelines table, the starting point for a Category B1 offense is a ten (10) year suspension.
- b. The applicable sanction range for Category B1 is from a five (5) year suspension to a Life Ban.

103. Steps 3 and 4 – Aggravating and Mitigating Factors / Other Considerations:

- a. Aggravating Factors: Mr Lindell was an experienced professional player who had completed the TIPP training multiple times and should have been aware of his reporting obligations. Mr Lindell coordinated with Dandiwal's known match-fixing network, a significant threat to tennis integrity and amplifying the reputational damage to the sport. Lastly, material gain is inferred from payments to [REDACTED] (\$5,300 AUD) linked to the fix.
- b. Mitigating Factors: Balanced against the above are several matters in mitigation. This is Mr Lindell's first anti-corruption offence; he co-operated with the investigation, attending voluntary interviews in 2018 and making his devices available for forensic extraction; he has been retired from professional tennis since 2021 and thus poses a reduced forward-looking risk; and, finally, more than six years have elapsed since the offence occurred.
- c. Assessment: Considering the B1 starting point of 10 years, the serious nature of the proven match-fixing offenses, and balancing the aggravating and mitigating factors, a significant period of ineligibility is warranted. The mitigating factors, especially his retirement and the passage of time, justify a reduction from the 10-year starting point. The AHO determines that a period of ineligibility of seven (7) years is appropriate and proportionate. The ban shall commence on the date of this decision and expire at midnight on the corresponding date in 2032.

104. Step 5 – Applicable Fine:

- d. Section H.1.a.(i) allows for a fine up to \$250,000. The Fines Table in the Guidelines indicates a range of USD 25 000 to USD 250 000 for Category B offences. The Fines Table in the Sanctioning Guidelines suggests a fine for 1-5 Major Offenses is in the range of \$0 to \$25,000. Given the seriousness of the offenses, a substantial fine is appropriate. Considering Mr Lindell's testimony about his current financial situation ([REDACTED]) and the length of the suspension, a fine at the lower to mid-end of the applicable scale is considered. Therefore, the AHO determines that a fine of \$10,000 USD shall be imposed.

105. Based on the above findings, the AHO makes the following orders:

ORDERS

106. Christian Lindell, a Covered Person as defined in Section B.10. and B.27 of the TACP 2024, is liable for Corruption Offenses pursuant to the following sections of TACP 2024

- i. 1 charge under Section D.1.b
- ii. 1 charge under Section D.1.d
- iii. 1 charge under Section D.1.e
- iv. 1 charge under Section D.2.a.i

107. Pursuant to the TACP and Guidelines the sanctions imposed on the Covered Person for these breaches of the 2024 TACP are a ban from Participation in any Sanctioned Event for a period of seven (7) years in accordance with Section H.

108. The above ordered suspension shall commence on and is effective from the day after this Decision as prescribed in Section F.6.h.(ii) of the 2024 TACP. The period begins on the 10 June 2025 and ends on the 9 June 2032.

109. Under Section H.1.a.(i) a fine of \$ 10,000 USD is imposed. A payment plan may be agreed between parties for payment of this fine.

110. This Decision shall be publicly reported in full as prescribed in Section G.4.e of the 2024 TACP.

111. Under Section G.4.d, this Decision is “full, final and complete disposition of the matter and will be binding on all parties.”

112. The Decision herein is appealable under Section I of the 2024 TACP to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”) in Lausanne, Switzerland. Under Section I of the TACP the deadline for filing an appeal with CAS must be made within a period of “twenty business days from the date of receipt of the decision by the appealing party.

113. Under Section I of the 2024 TACP the suspension ordered herein shall remain in effect while under appeal unless CAS orders otherwise.

Dated at Belgrade, Serbia this 9th day of June 2025



Diana Tesic, Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer